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AN ALTERNATIVE AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY FOR UKRAINE

by

Randall G. Williams

June 1993

Thesis Advisor:

Roman Laba

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An Alternative American
Foreign Policy for Ukraine

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., St. Lawrence University, 1982

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

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This thesis examines Western security goals and analyzes the current means available to achieve those goals. The contention of this thesis is that present Western policy pursuits will lead to a regenerated authoritarian Russian superpower that will be a threat to the security of Ukraine and Europe. The potentially dangerous consequences of an authoritarian Russia could be avoided by facilitating the development of a strong and stable Ukraine to act as a balance to Russian power in Eastern Europe.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION -----	1
	A. WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS -----	2
	B. ALTERNATIVE SECURITY GOALS -----	2
	C. CONCLUSIONS -----	8
II.	THE TREATIES -----	12
	A. TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE -----	12
	B. STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START) -----	15
	C. ROADBLOCKS TO IMPLEMENTATION -----	17
	D. THE BALANCE OF POWER -----	20
III.	SECURITY STRUCTURES -----	26
	A. POSSIBLE EUROPEAN POLICY VEHICLES -----	26
	B. CONCLUSIONS -----	32
IV.	UNITED STATES AID POLICY -----	35
V.	INTERNAL UKRAINE -----	41
	A. ECONOMY -----	41
	B. ENERGY -----	43
	C. CONCLUSIONS -----	45
VI.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS -----	46

LIST OF REFERENCES	51
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	55

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
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the discussion of the security interest of the United States and Europe in the post-Cold War era, it is important to make the distinction between goals and means. Throughout the Cold War the goal of security for the United States and Europe was the prevention of conflict with the Soviet Union. Failure to achieve this goal could have led, at least, to the destruction of Europe and possible global nuclear confrontation. The establishment of this goal led to the development of the means to achieve it. These means were manifested in three forms: structures, treaties and policy. Through the interaction of the means, interested participants pursue the established goal in accordance with their own national interest.

In the post-Cold War era, the goal that defined the evolution of the means has been achieved; now what remains are the means. The task that now faces the Western powers is to define the new goals with regards to the security environment that has emerged after the breakup of the Soviet Union so that current means can either evolve or new means develop, to facilitate amended security goals.

American policy makers have largely ignored Ukraine in their global policy considerations. This lack of consideration shows a neglect of the potential for conflict in Eastern Europe. American foreign policy toward Ukraine, that is rooted in the START and NPT Treaties, is doomed to fail, and will actually sow the seeds of chaos, unless the United States: 1) comes to understand the motivations that drive Ukrainian foreign policy,

and 2) facilitates significant positive alterations to the security and economic environment that has developed since the breakup of the Soviet Union.

This thesis commences with a description of Western security goals, in relationship to the former Soviet Union, to demonstrate that these goals are dependent on Cold War means that do not address current security interests. The prevailing security situation will be defined through exploring the treaties, structures and aid policies that remain for policy makers today. The analysis of these means of policy pursuit will show that the current use of means is inconsistent with sound policy goals.

The overall security goal for both the United States and Europe continues to be the prevention of destructive conflict that would wreck the current European order. The economic and social benefits of a peaceful incorporation of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union into an open international order are intuitively obvious. The Bush administration suffered the consequences of supporting a strong central government in the Soviet Union beyond its political viability. By pursuing this policy, the administration was caught unprepared to deal with the proliferation of new nuclear and conventional powers. Due to the Moscow-centric nature of Washington's policy, Russia automatically assumed the mantle of central power. This transition took place without regard to the new dynamics for Western security that developed from the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The specific goal question that arises for Western security in the development of the open international order is, what role does the West want Russia to play? Two scenarios for Russia's role exist for the West to consider: first is Russia as a regenerated superpower, second is the development of other states of the former Soviet bloc as a buffer or balance

to potential Russian power.

Territorial reconstitution of the Empire, whether it be the Soviet or Russian, will mean the forceful subjugation of peoples who now reside in independent states. The people of the new republics have demonstrated the will to exist independently of Russian domination but the West would be powerless to help them. Terrorism against Russia would inevitably arise out of domination. An authoritarian Russia would present the West with Human Rights policy problems on a larger scale than in the Cold War. Combine these factors with a potential refugee burden unlike any in recent history, and the security problems for the West are obvious. The threat of a third World War and the potential for nuclear holocaust seems to have slipped from the West's collective consciousness. Were Russia to embark on a campaign to reconstitute, what options would the West have? The standard answer to this question would be that Russia, economically, could not afford a pursuit of this nature, and is on the verge of collapse itself. History demonstrates that politics do not only fight wars over economics, nationalist forces and territorial claims have driven many conflicts.

The United States can not allow a regenerated Russian super power. Engagement in Europe requires a security strategy that uses Ukraine as balance to Russian power, this will provide the West the opportunity and the time to draw Russia into a community of nations in Europe that benefits overall security. Ukraine will be included in this community with its large economic potential and position as security buffer for its region. These factors will allow the United States to continue to focus domestically on economic reform without the disruption of a new threat to European Security.

I. INTRODUCTION

Continuing threatening statements from Russian leaders combined with a history of Russian aggression and domination have defined the number one priority for Ukrainian policy makers: survival. All Ukrainian policy decisions are rooted in this idea and understanding it is essential to the success of any American Foreign policy initiatives. When asked if the previous was true, Valerie Kuchinsky, the envoy extroadinare for Ukraine's Ambassador to the United States replied, "Yes, and not only that, we will not go back no matter what the cost." [Ref. 1]

American policy makers have largely ignored Ukraine in their global policy considerations. This lack of consideration shows a neglect of the potential for conflict in Eastern Europe. American foreign policy toward Ukraine, that is rooted in the START and NPT Treaties, is doomed to fail, and will actually sow the seeds of chaos, unless the United States: 1) comes to understand the motivations that drive Ukrainian foreign policy, and 2) facilitates significant positive alterations to the security and economic environment that has developed since the breakup of the Soviet Union.

This thesis will commence with a description of Western security goals, in relationship to the former Soviet Union, to demonstrate that these goals are dependent on Cold War means that do not address current security interests. The prevailing security situation will be defined through exploring the treaties, structures and aid policies that

exist for policy makers today. The analysis of these means of policy pursuit will show that the current use of means is inconsistent with sound policy goals.

A. WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS

In the discussion of the security interest of the United States and Europe in the post-Cold War era, it is important to make the distinction between goals and means. Throughout the Cold War the goal of security for the United States and Europe was the prevention of conflict with the Soviet Union. Failure to achieve this goal could have led, at least, to the destruction of Europe and possibly, global nuclear confrontation. The establishment of this goal led to the development of the means to achieve it. These means were manifested in three forms, structures, treaties, and policy. Through the interaction of the means, interested participants pursue the established goal in accordance with their own national interest.

In the post-Cold War era the goal that defined the evolution of the means has been achieved; now what remains are the means. The task that now faces the Western powers is to define the new goals with regards to the security environment that has emerged after the breakup of the Soviet Union so that current means can either evolve or new means develop, to facilitate amended security goals.

B. ALTERNATIVE SECURITY GOALS

The overall security goal for both the United States and Europe continues to be the prevention of destructive conflict that would wreck the current European order. The economic and social benefits of a peaceful incorporation of Eastern Europe and the former

Soviet Union into an open international order are intuitively obvious. The Bush administration suffered the consequences of supporting a strong central government in the Soviet Union beyond its political viability. By pursuing this policy, the administration was caught unprepared to deal with the proliferation of new nuclear and conventional powers. Due to the Moscow-centric nature of Washington's policy, Russia immediately assumed the mantle of central power. This transition took place without regard to the new dynamics for Western security that developed from the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The specific goal question that arises for Western security in the development of the open international order is, what role does the West want Russia to play? Two scenarios for Russia's role exist for the West to consider: first, is Russia as a regenerated superpower, second is the development of other states of the former Soviet bloc as a buffer or balance to potential Russian power.

1. Russia as Regenerated Superpower.

The benefits of a regenerated Russian superpower are very tempting to both Russian and Western policy makers alike. "Given Russia's 148 million people and its thousands of nuclear warheads, there may be few alternatives to a Russian-centered policy right now. And tight budgets in the West don't leave much money to lavish on the other republics...." [Ref. 2:p. A16]

Russia is perceived to provide the most potential return on investment of Western diplomacy and resources. The concentration of nuclear forces within Russia would simplify negotiations for the elimination of these forces. Russia has been recognized as the successor state to the Soviet Union and has taken possession of all

Former Soviet diplomatic assets outside its borders. Russia agreed to accept responsibility for the repayment of all foreign debt of the former Soviet Union. Finally, the economic potential of Russia holds promise for Western developers. The focus of Western assistance has been the Russian Federation, \$24 billion from the G-7 in 1992 and the promise of \$1.8 billion from the Vancouver Summit of 1993. The largely Russo-centric nature of the aid was justified, as Ambassador Talbott described, due to the "magnitude of the problems it [Russia] poses, and of the opportunities it presents." [Ref. 3:p. 7]

The acceptance of Russia as a de facto great power is pervasive in Western political thought. Paul Goble, a former State Department expert on Soviet nationalities, stated in May of 1992 that the United States is still trying to treat the former Soviet Union as if it were, "Russia and branch offices." [Ref. 2:p. A16] One year later, at a conference sponsored by Stanford University, Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Tarasyuk noted that the State Department had listed the addresses for its embassies in the republics of the former Soviet Union under the heading of Russia. The United States has made efforts to be more inclusive of other republics, particularly Ukraine, but policy has remained Russo-centric.

Russia is in the midst of a self-redefinition that belies historical precedent. Soviet history depicts hegemony over all of Eastern Europe while pre-Soviet history shows an empire that stretched well beyond the current borders of the Federation. If Western aspirations to create an economically stable Russia were to be successful, what would they have created? The Charter for American and Russian Partnership and Friendship depicts a "strategic partnership [between the two powers, The United States

and Russia] in the international arena, in the interest of advancing and defending common democratic values...." The dilemma proposed by such a statement is best described by Henry Kissinger, "Is it prudent to base policy on the assumption that an evolution barely three years old has already reversed a pattern of centuries?" [Ref. 4] Herein lies the danger for Western acceptance of a regenerated Russian superpower; how would Russian expansionary and authoritarian forces be controlled and how could the West respond? Former president Richard Nixon warned that the fall of the current Russian government would create a world where, "We will again live in a dangerous world with the threat of nuclear war hanging over our heads. The wave of freedom sweeping the world will ebb and we could get caught in the undertow." [Ref. 5:p. A19]

The April 1993 ascension of Belarus to the 1992 Tashkent "collective security" accord, combined with provisions for extended Russian troop presence in Belarus, creates an environment where, "Ukraine is the major remaining obstacle to an extended Russian empire." [Ref. 6:p. 44] Russian claims to Ukraine stem from a wide and potentially dangerous combination of sources. Two competing perceptions of history provide the motivation for Ukraine's desire for independence and Russia's cultural and territorial claims.

The Russian historical perspective permeates modern Russian thinking. Ukraine is seen as a part of Russia that is as inseparable as Moscow or St. Petersburg. "The contest for the inheritance of Kievan Rus has represented one of the oldest bones of contention in the history of Russian-Ukrainian cultural and political relations." [Ref. 7:p. 3] During a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Berman

discussed a meeting with Vice president of the Russian Federation Alexander Rutskoi. Rutskoi had a portrait of Peter the Great and a map of the Soviet Union hanging in his office. After the meeting Rep Berman asked, "why the Vice president of the Russian Federation had the map of the former Soviet Union hanging on his wall?" Mr. Rutskoi answered that, "the political and geostrategic forces are so strong so very soon we will be back to the old map, therefore there is no reason to change it." [This is not exactly verbatim, but it is very close to what Mr. Berman said that Rutskoi had told him. [Ref. 8:p. 3]] In addition to this, Rep. Lantos commented that it does not help matters when, "the Russian ambassador to Ukraine goes around and says that the current situation [i.e., Ukraine's independence] is a temporary one." [Ref. 8:p. 2] The Ambassador further stated that Ukrainian independence was unlikely to last another year and a half. [Ref. 9:p. 23] Finally, a leading Russian parliamentarian was quoted as saying, "the present day borders of the Russian Federation which confine Russia to her 18th-century borders should not be considered inviolable." [Ref. 10:p. 46]

Modern Russian political thinkers believe that Russia, in idea, is not the same as the physical borders that constrain the Russian Federation. Statements by Russian leaders regarding the protection of Russian minorities in the other new republics and territorial assertions such as the Crimean controversy, cast further doubt upon the inviability of borders. With regard to the Crimea, the Russian parliament voted to consider Krushchev's transfer of that area to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954 as a "political decision of the old Politburo" [Ref. 11] encouraging Russians in the Crimea to begin movements for autonomy. This crisis was diffused by Kravchuk and Yeltsin, yet it raised

great concern throughout the west in the Spring of 1992. President Yeltsin has not demonstrated a willingness to support into the pursuit of Russian expansionism and has instead preferred to focus on economic reform. Only one person stands between the potential Russian expansion that many Russians see as their right by virtue of an imperial legacy. Yet, Mr. Yeltsin has given Ukrainians cause for concern by urging other Eastern European countries not to develop close ties with Ukraine because it falls within the Russian sphere of influence. [Ref. 9:p. 23]

Russian re-unification with Ukraine could only be accomplished through the use of force. Three potential results of this forced reunification exist: first is a large scale war with Ukraine; second, the need for large scale police organizations to deal with potential Ukrainian terrorist activities; and third is the question of whether Russia would disintegrate internally under the economic and social pressure that a war with Ukraine would create. These scenarios would not produce a government committed to democratic principles but an authoritarian regime that would need intimidation and the threat of force to maintain order. A regime of this nature, in power in Moscow, would be a threat to the security of all of Europe and the United States.

2. Ukraine as a Balance to Russian Hegemony.

Considering the potentially dangerous results of a regenerated Russian superpower, Western policy makers should turn to the alternative. A balance of power in Eastern Europe that will not allow an environment to develop that would facilitate Russian trends toward authoritarianism and expansion. Ukraine is the key to an effective deterrent for the prevention of a resurgent, re-emergent Russian threat. Ukraine is on the

front line of Russian hegemony over the territories of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Western support would draw a subtle line that present and future Russian leaders could not cross.

A strong and stable Ukraine that is on good terms with both the West and Russia could allow Russia to develop an internal focus on reform and democracy. If the international security environment precludes any Russian expansionary forces while facilitating the development of internal structures compatible with Western ideals, Russia may be coaxed into the community of democratic states as a partner and not an adversary.

American policy makers have not been addressing the question of the future of security and peace on the European continent. Instead, concentration has been on the means of previous goals such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty or the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The ramifications of compliance with these treaties has not been fully explored. Treaties that were negotiated to achieve the goals of the bi-polar Cold War context may need to be reviewed in light of post-Cold War security goals. It is not the contention of this argument that these "means in place" be junked, but instead that their focus and importance be reviewed. A balance of power in Eastern Europe would prove more conducive to the goal of stability than a potentially authoritarian Russia.

C. CONCLUSIONS

Western Security lies in the prevention of conflict in Europe. The breakup of the Soviet Union was heralded as victory for the West in the hard fought Cold War. It can be argued that the aftermath of this war looks very similar to the end of any other war.

The "loser," that is the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states, have suffered from economic devastation and political uncertainty that has led to the redefinition of the political structures within the vanquished lands. The difference that the conclusion of the Cold War brings to history is that the revolution that it inspired has brought a sense of victory to many of the vanquished peoples instead of a sense of defeat. This is not so for Russia. Russia struggles to redefine herself outside the historical context of Russian development. The "victors," the West, are still left with the problems of what to do about post-war reconstruction.

The new nations that have developed out of the former Soviet Union present a unique security and stability problem to the West. Russia and Ukraine emerge with significant military capability that Western nations can not dictate terms to. The end of most modern wars usually coincides with the destruction of the military capability of the vanquished nation. With the successor states of the former Soviet Union this is not the case.

Conflicts and political unrest have already generated a new problem that Western Europe must deal with quickly or it threatens the political stability of even the most prosperous nations. Refugees and asylum seekers have been pouring into Western Europe at alarming rates. Since the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict, 607,000 people have migrated to Western Europe, one-third of those to Germany alone. Rumanians are the new wave of asylum seekers, 98,000 so far this year. [Ref. 12:p. 51] The presence of foreigners within Western Europe has caused a heightening of racial tensions that has been most obvious in Germany. Right and left wing violence has been very visible since

the fall of 1992. Currently, foreigners are arriving at a rate of 60 thousand a month in Germany and there is no end in sight, and no legal way for it to be regulated. [Ref. 13:p. 15]

The potential refugee problem that exists from Russia and Ukraine could be staggering. Neither of these countries is doing well economically. Ukraine's budget deficit for 1992 will be 45 percent of GDP¹, and any economic collapse or involvement in conflict is likely to generate a refugee problem. Western Europe is already experiencing the effects of its current refugee crisis. Any addition would only serve to exacerbate the problem. The refugee problems generated by conflict between Russia and Ukraine demonstrates another incentive for both the United States and Western Europe to become involved in ensuring stability within, and between, Russia and Ukraine.

Communism gave Europe a common enemy that clearly focused foreign policy goals. Security and defense had nearly the same definition, which was rooted in avoiding invasion from the East and deterring the threat of nuclear war. The conclusion of the struggle with the Soviet Empire has brought a new set of parameters that will define security and defense for Europe. The current transition phase has arrived in a Europe that has been unable to clearly establish the security goals that will facilitate the development of a new power balance.

¹For a good description of the economic situation in either of these countries see the Economist, December 5, 1992 which contains several articles about the economic condition of both Russia and Ukraine. According to the Economist, Russia is in much better shape than Ukraine but neither is considered prosperous yet and the potential for economic calamity is high.

The following chapters of this thesis will present the different means, treaties, structures and policies, currently in place, that lay the ground work for a potential Russian dictatorship. Each chapter will also demonstrate how these means could be used to prevent the re-emergence of a Russian threat while still allowing for the maintenance of Russia's current move towards democracy and a free market system. Ukraine will be considered within these means to act as a "buffer" or "balance" to Russian hegemony while increasing Western security potential. Developing a strong and stable Ukraine will also generate an environment where Russia can carry out domestic reform.

II. THE TREATIES

A. TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

The original purpose of the CFE treaty was to enhance stability in Europe by eliminating force disparities that could entice a preemptive attack by either NATO or Warsaw Pact nations. [Ref. 14:p. 2] This landmark agreement was made possible by an unprecedented security environment between East and West. Gorbachev made his willingness to cut military strength known and it was on January 15, 1989 that final agreement on the CFE mandate was reached. The Treaty was actually signed on November 19, 1990. [Ref. 14:p. 1]

The rapidity and comprehensiveness of this accomplishment deserves some attention. This was a treaty that was hailed as a step to bringing lasting peace to a Europe that had never known it. CFE was not a new idea; it had been on the table for over 16 years when the international political climate made it feasible for all parties involved. The deteriorating economic and political condition of the Soviet Union, combined with a changing orientation in central Europe and impending German reunification, set the stage for CFE. CFE was a convenient vehicle that both politically and economically satisfied the needs of both East and West. [Ref. 14:pp. 3-5] The break-up of the Soviet Union had brought serious doubts to the treaty's chances for survival.

The remarkable flexibility of the treaty, or perhaps the severity of the economic and political situation, provided for the rapid adoption of a modified agreement with the new republics of the former Soviet Union. In reality, underlying causes for an expedient agreement had not gone away and, if anything, they had worsened. The new republics were searching for legitimacy from the West and were willing to negotiate agreements that might lead to assistance in economic stabilization. This was the climate that surrounded the settlement that delivered new reduction figures to the West in May of 1992 [Ref. 15:pp. 18-19], ratification in July of 1992 [Ref. 16] and verification teams conducting inspections in August of 1992 [Ref. 17].

The first determinant of the allocation of the military assets of the former Soviet Union is the physical location of the assets in question. This factor is significant for two reasons: first it gives a baseline for allocation, and second it establishes responsibility for compliance. With the signing of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) treaty and the nationalization of military structures and their assets, both Ukraine and Russia made their conventional asset capability a foregone conclusion. Russia retained assets that were on her soil and all of the Group of Forces [Ref. 15:p. 18]² while Ukraine absorbed the forces on her soil. These force numbers are depicted in the table below:

²The Group Forces are the former Soviet forces in East Germany, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; all these forces are currently controlled by Russia.

	Tanks	ACV's	Artillery	Aircraft	Helos	Total
Ukraine	6204	6394	3052	1431	285	17366
Russia	5017	6279	3480	2750	570	18096
GoF	5587	11059	4591	1411	465	23113
Rus total	10604	17338	8071	4161	1035	41209

The revelation that the above table provides is that more than half of the current Russian force structure is located outside the Russian borders.

The second impact of the CFE Treaty comes in the form of the apportionment of the former Soviet Union's entitlement to conventional forces based on the CFE Treaty and the Tashkent agreement: [Ref. 15:p. 18]

	Tanks	ACV's	Artillery	Aircraft	Helos	Total
Ukraine	4080	5050	4040	1090	330	14590
Russia	6400	11480	6415	3450	890	28635

Under the entitlement plan, Russia retains almost twice the entitlement of Ukraine, which is congruous with the natural division along territorial lines after the breakup of the Soviet military.

The ease with which the West was able to gain commitment and compliance to the CFE Treaty is obviously a function of the need for stability that all parties see in this area. The mutually beneficial situation that emerged for both the West and the new Republics was that the treaty gave political legitimacy to, and a vehicle for, a reduction in military forces that the crumbling economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union had already made inevitable. The Russian General Staff had already re-evaluated

the policy toward NATO and had come to a conclusion that it would take only 60 to 65 divisions to accomplish current Russian goals. [Ref. 15:p. 5] Russian goals have continued to scale down as the military moves to a new lighter more mobile concept in accordance with the new military doctrine. This military doctrine also states that separatist forces in the republics are a threat that requires the application of military force.

Ukraine stands to benefit from treaty compliance. The treaty established the force levels for the Ukrainian armed forces greater than they had announced as their stated goals. CFE and the Tashkent agreement legitimized Ukrainian military aspirations and laid the groundwork for future force structure. The treaty gives the new government legitimate reasons for scaling down conventional forces that will not appear as government efforts to threaten jobs. It also provides a logical avenue for interaction with the militaries of Western powers and ensures stable force levels on their eastern border.

B. STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START)

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of July 31, 1991 was originally an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States that was designed to bring about reductions in the strategic arsenals of those countries. After the breakup of the Soviet Union there was concern in the United States over the fate of the substantial nuclear arsenal and who would control it. Two different avenues were being pursued by Russia and Ukraine over strategic policy. Russia's answer was to set up the CIS and use it to manage nuclear assets. Ukraine asserted that it would only accept independent negotiations on these matters. [Ref. 18:pp. 54-56] The West's response was to make agreement on some form of nuclear management a condition of recognition. [Ref. 19:pp.

45-46] The political maneuvering culminated in a meeting in Lisbon at which a protocol to the original treaty was agreed upon by the United States and the four new republics that possessed nuclear weapons.

Article V of this protocol states that Ukraine, Byelarus and Kazakhstan intend to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states. [Ref. 20:p. 2] This action was thought to be a foregone conclusion for Ukraine as the declaration of sovereignty had contained an article stating that Ukraine intended to become a nuclear free state. It was commonly accepted as political fact that to pursue a nuclear program in Ukraine or Byelarus, the states most directly effected by the Chernobyl disaster, would be "political suicide." [Ref. 21:p. 17]

Ukraine submitted a letter of addendum to the Protocol that specifically described their intent in accordance with the Protocol. The language used by Kravchuk in his letter to President Bush is significant in its ambiguity and room for political maneuvering. First he states, "Ukraine...emphasizes its right to control of the non-use of nuclear weapons deployed in its territory." [Ref. 22] Kravchuk continues, "Ukraine will take into account its national security interests in conducting this activity (elimination of all nuclear weapons)" [Ref. 22:p. 1] and that "The process of elimination of nuclear weapons should be carried out under reliable international control." [Ref. 22:p. 1] These statements indicate Kravchuk's understanding of the high political value the West places on nuclear weapons. This language also offered Ukraine an "escape route" for conditional or partial compliance. Ukraine has not ratified the START agreement and the debate within parliament over this issue continues.

C. ROADBLOCKS TO IMPLEMENTATION

1. CFE.

The CFE Treaty would seem to have the potential to be a security bonanza for the West. Yet there are some significant problems that need to be examined and, surprisingly enough, cost is not one of them. Germany undertook to destroy a portion of Tanks and APC's in accordance with the CFE Treaty. It cost them \$8K for each Tank and \$3.5K for each APC. [Ref. 23:pp. 40-41] Referring to the previous discussion of the CFE Treaty, see that Russia will have to destroy over 4200 Tanks and over 5800 APC's. This incurs a price tag, based on what German cost estimates were, of over \$55 million. Russians will incur a cost of nearly \$9 million a year to cover just these two categories in compliance with the Treaty's seven-year time frame. Using this same logic, Ukraine will be required to spend \$23 million over the seven-year period in order to comply with CFE, this being a more manageable figure. Cost is not an issue when it comes to CFE compliance.

Russia has been caught in a predicament due to the geographical distribution of forces that was required by Soviet military doctrine. The forces that remained within the territorial boundaries of the Russian republic are "second echelon units equipped and manned to only 50 percent to 60 percent of their combat capacity." [Ref. 21:p. 6] Russia has been forced to depend on returning troops from Germany as the center of its future force structure. These are well equipped and well trained troops but getting them back to Russia and garrisoned will not be easy. Even the defense minister, General Grachev, has called the four-year time table for withdrawal from Germany,

"defeatist." [Ref. 24:pp. 37-38] That the cornerstone of the new Russian army is four years away from complete return to Russia suggests that the current force structure is in disarray.

The second problem for the CFE Treaty will be preventing a conventional weapons yard sale. Too much pressure for compliance without sensitivity to the economic impact of, and the social burden of, unemployed military men could drive these republics to seek hard currency alternatives. The West must be careful not to allow a situation where radical elements can gain power or more moderate leaders are forced to sell off military inventories to alleviate economic hardship.

The precedents have already been established for this sort of behavior. The hard-fought balance of power in the Middle East is threatened by Iran's purchase of a virtually complete high-tech air force. In July 1992, the Russians concluded a \$2.5 billion deal that sends 12 TU-22M Backfires, 24 MiG-31 interceptors, 2 Mainstay airborne radar control aircraft, 48 MiG-29 fighters, 24 MiG-27 ground attack fighters and a variety of SAM batteries to Iran. [Ref. 25:pp. 123-124] Such large scale complete systems will significantly change power balances in any area. The discussion does not even consider the effect that this type of conventional weapons transfer will have on the viability of a Western arms industry that faces severe defense budget decreases.

The final problem with the CFE Treaty is that of the smaller Republics. The smaller republics, such as Georgia or Moldova, can have a significant impact on whether the two larger republics of Ukraine and Russia will be able to comply with the Treaty. The smaller republics have not yet managed to develop stable regimes. This

threat of instability could require Ukraine or Russia to posture forces to provide security for their citizens within the vicinity. These limited conflicts could develop into delays in destruction and inspection schedules. Russia has already broached this topic by asking the West to allow for the movement of troops from beyond the Urals to compensate for threats on its southern border.

2. START.

The difficulties for compliance with the START Treaty and the follow-on agreement are twofold; money and security. The trend that develops when analyzing any new policy in the region of the former Soviet Union is, who will pay to clean this mess up? Western powers realize that this is a security opportunity unprecedented in modern history. The opportunity picked a bad time, economically, to present itself. The *realpolitik* of the START treaty is that the signatories are willing to sign agreements that can not be met, based on the current facilities available, their realistic economic resources and individual security concerns.

Russia has currently accepted responsibility for the destruction of nuclear weapons in compliance with the START I&II Treaties. Comparing the number of warheads that this destruction entails and Russian facilities for destruction demonstrates that compliance without serious Western assistance is unlikely. In 1991, Soviet officials estimated the dismantling capabilities at their two cites to be approximately 2000 warheads a year if regulations on safety are observed. [Ref. 16:p. 45] Under current agreement, Russia has stated that by the year 2000 it would move to 3000-3500 strategic warheads if "the United States can contribute to the financing of the destruction or elimination of

strategic arms." [Ref. 27:p. 1] This indicates a willingness to destroy 6737 warheads over the next seven years. That is just over 960 warheads a year and is within their claimed capabilities. There are two factors that cast doubt on the Russian ability to comply. The first is that these two facilities are merely dismantling facilities and do not provide for adequate storage for the residual material. Uranium can be processed and used commercially but plutonium is a different case. There is currently no feasible way to destroy large quantities of plutonium available in the world. Plutonium would have to be mixed with highly radioactive waste and stored. Storage facilities of this magnitude do not exist. [Ref. 26:p. 46]

The question of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements is more likely to receive significant attention from the West than conventional agreements. Western politicians have been forced to order their priorities based on what they can afford. Nuclear disarmament is high on that list. The United States has already pledged \$400 million to assist in compliance but the price tag is expected to run into the billions. [Ref. 19:p. 45] This brings to light another possible obstruction to the implementation of the START Treaty: the Western powers.

D. THE BALANCE OF POWER

John Mueller argued in 1989 that "nuclear weapons neither define a fundamental stability or threaten to disturb it." [Ref. 28:p. 55]³ In a review of Mueller's work, Carl Kaysen goes on to describe how society has come to view major war as both politically

³It is Mueller's contention that war among western, modern nations has become "subnationally unthinkable."

and economically unacceptable. He continues by saying that when Reagan and Gorbachev agreed that nuclear war could not be won and therefore must not be fought that they were articulating a societally foregone conclusion. [Ref. 29:p. 42]⁴ These arguments can be extended to the developing balance of power between Russia, Ukraine and the West.

Russia may believe or come to assume that as the nuclear successor state to the Soviet Union they are also successor to the superpower status of that state. This will eventually backfire for them. It is politically, economically and militarily unimaginable for the Russian republic to expect to use a nuclear weapon any time in the foreseeable future. Attack against any Western power is not a real issue. What is, is pressure or war against another republic. The West provides a substantial amount of economic support to the current political regime and any successive regime, whether radical or moderate, would face rapid economic extinction, or perhaps nuclear conflict, if strategic weapons were used.

1. Russia.

The conventional balance becomes very important for Russia, in light of a nuclear non-sequitur. In terms of the settlement of the CFE Treaty it would appear that the Russian Republic will end up with the bulk of the conventional assets.⁵ Many of the assets that Russia is heir to, roughly 50%, are outside the territorial borders of the

⁴Kaysen adds an addendum to his essay that discusses the then infant signs of radical change in Europe. He predicts that this will be the first time in history that changes of this magnitude will take place without major war. The possibility of civil unrest is not ruled out.

⁵See Ref. 15 for a more extensive discussion of the numbers provided earlier in this paper.

Russian Republic. In light of the actual forces present in the Russian republic and their reserve nature, and compared to the forces that Ukraine inherited, it would seem that Ukraine is in a window of relative superiority. A senior officer of the Moscow General Staff stated that the forces in Ukraine could "easily defeat the whole of Russia in a matter of days." [Ref. 21:p. 6] Whether or not this is actually possible is of little consequence, as the perception would be enough to prevent any conventional offensive military action against Ukraine.

Russia can not ignore the fact that economics will play a big part in the future of military planning and policy. Russia currently supports an army of 2.3M men and has stated that force reductions will reach 1.5M by 1995 and that there will be a move to an all-volunteer army. The volunteer army could cost \$375M dollars more a year that the government does not have. [Ref. 24:pp. 37-38] Currently a major reason for slowly phasing-in returning forces from outside Russia is that there is a lack of housing and facilities. This fact does not please areas such as the Baltics where they want Russian troops out as soon as possible, but will not see removal at least until 1994. [Ref. 24:p. 37] The unemployment caused by rapid demobilization would generate significant unrest. There is not an economy in the world that could suddenly absorb 800K unemployed soldiers.

It is evident that Russia has superior numbers on paper but it will be some time before that force is consolidated into an effective fighting force. The fact that the forces of the former Soviet Union were some of the finest equipped and highly trained in the world just a few short years ago can not be underestimated.

With each passing day Russia and Ukraine remain in conflict over territorial, economic and security issues. The hangover of day-to-day problems in building a modern state occurs after the honeymoon of independence has set in. On a personal power level, Yeltsin could not afford to attack Ukraine either by surprise or through a nationalist build-up. This situation simply is contradictory to all that he has accomplished and would probably lead to his downfall. As long as he maintains personal power, Ukraine has little to fear.

The question of nuclear weapons should be quite easy for Russia. Get control of all of the weapons, and agree to anything the West wants as long as it is economically feasible. Russia has already succeeded in convincing the West that it should remain a nuclear state when other members of the CIS have pledged a non-nuclear status. The West has allowed this to happen because Western leaders could not handle a situation economically or logistically where the Russians declared themselves nuclear free. The economic resources or dismantling facilities do not exist on that scale. Secondly, political stability in Russia is delicate and any overt pressure portraying defeat in the cold war would be counter productive. To force a Russian leader into a political choice between power in his own country and international acceptance would make for a very easy decision on the Russian's part. Nuclear stability is of the highest importance to the West and could prove a tremendous economic lever if used cautiously and subtly.

2. Ukraine.

Ukrainian leaders knew that the number one priority in making Ukraine a viable and independent state was to put as much distance between them and Russia as

quickly as possible. The historic attitudes toward the "Little Russians" and an intimate knowledge of Russian imperialism made the cause for defense against Russian chauvinism an initial unifying principal in the drive for independence. The establishment of a nuclear free state and a Ukrainian Armed Forces were significant instruments for success in this policy pursuit.

The Ukrainians are beginning to suffer the same independence hangover that has afflicted the Russians. President Kravchuk has been adept at using "Ukraine's maximalist stance on a broad range of military issues, a tactic that since last August has won Kiev many victories in battles with Moscow over Ukraine's military inheritance." [Ref. 30:p. 10] The continued pursuit of this policy can be expected for quite sometime. Ukraine will try and use the terms of the START Treaty to push for international monitoring of destruction to ensure that Russia complies with the promises that it will be hard pressed to keep economically. The continued blustering will serve to keep the Russians busy while Ukraine continues to solidify its new command structure and Ministry of Defense. During the drive for independence, the coopting of the military was of high priority and a majority of personnel took the oath of allegiance even though a majority are not Ukrainian. Russians make up 44% of the total force in Ukraine and 60% of the officer corps. [Ref. 30:Endnote 18] Kravchuk made promises to the officer corps that their rights would be protected, they would be Ukrainian citizens, they would have proper living conditions and impartial personnel policy. [Ref. 30:p. 7]

Ukraine has been hard pressed to meet any of these promises with the exception of citizenship. Housing is becoming critical. Lieutenant General Stepanov

said, "roughly half of all officers and noncommissioned officers in his district lacked sufficient accommodation." [Ref. 30:p. 6] The second problem that faces Ukraine is the displacement of officers with force reductions. It is estimated that the officer corps will have to be reduced by as much as 50%. This has caused significant dissension between the ethnic Ukrainians and Russians of the Ukrainian Army Officers Union. [Ref. 30:p. 9]

The previously mentioned difficulties with the ethnic Russian officer corps is truly a potential powder keg. The solution lies in improving economic conditions and using reductions mandated by CFE as just cause for military force restructuring. Ukraine will also have to go on a subtly engineered campaign to portray itself as an improving country that is a better place to be than Russia. This perception existed at the time of independence, and whether this was real or perceived is of little consequence. So long as the Russian officer believes that he is better off in Ukraine, he will continue to vote his wallet and his stomach. This campaign to portray Ukraine as a better place to be than Russia will also assist in developing new sources of investment.

It may sound trite to say that better times are only an advertising campaign away. Yet the perception of the people and their expectations are critical in Ukraine. With an increasing trend toward authoritarianism [Ref. 31:p. 56] and rising discontent among the peasants over government controlled grain prices. [Ref. 32:pp. 40-41] Kravchuk could be sliding toward a confrontation with the opposition parties within Ukraine.

III. SECURITY STRUCTURES

The issue that this chapter will discuss is, can the United States use current security structures to influence the security of the new Europe that extends to include the states of the former Soviet Union. The break-up of the Soviet Union appeared to be a security boon for Europe. The resulting political situation is one that Europe must take positive action to control. The level of stability throughout the "European" region of the former Soviet Union is not high, and armed conflicts are currently underway that could have significant ramifications for other European nations.

This chapter will describe the current European security mechanisms that the United States may use to influence security in this new Europe. Here the differences between the security interests of Europe and the United States will be demonstrated by defining the effectiveness of organizations and how the existing structures are equipped to deal with these interests. Specifically, this chapter will compare the emerging NACC with the CSCE to show how Europe and the United States intend to secure there interests and if these organizations are the correct vehicles to insure security in the region.

A. POSSIBLE EUROPEAN POLICY VEHICLES

As far as the policy objectives of the United States are concerned, there are only two European security structures where the United States can work to secure stability in the developing relationships with Russia and Ukraine. The United States holds membership in the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Other European security structures such as the

European Community or the Western European Union do not include the United States and are outside the sphere of direct influence.

1. NACC.

The NACC was established at the Rome summit in November of 1991 in response to requests from Eastern European and former Soviet Union nations to have some participation in NATO. The idea was originated by United States Secretary of State Baker and German Foreign Minister Genscher in a statement issued on October 2, 1991. [Ref. 33:p. 532] It was designed to be a "forum for confidence building and consultation between the NATO governments and the members of the former Warsaw Pact." [Ref. 34] The major difference between NATO and the NACC is that the former is a treaty organization rooted in collective defense; the later "contributes to the building of a new security architecture based on cooperative relations among states and a network of mutually reinforcing institutions." [Ref. 35:p. 1] The NACC is not a legally binding body and continues to espouse commitment to the CSCE. At the Oslo, Norway meeting of 5 June 1992, the NACC stated, "In support of The CSCE process and other institutions, we will work to increase stability and confidence and to promote transparency." [Ref. 35:pp. 1-2] The NACC furthers its support of CSCE by adding, "We are committed to with all CSCE participating states to ensure that the Helsinki Summit opens a significant new chapter in the CSCE process." [Ref. 35:p. 2]

This outright support would indicate that the NACC is not the waiting room for NATO that Karl Pfefferkorn indicated Eastern European nations had hoped it would be. [Ref. 36] Instead, the NACC appears to be developing into a forum where CSCE

states can discuss more military issues of planning, development, exercises and procurement. David Yost points out that a significant reason for the limited expansion of NACC is that it does not represent French interests in Europe. "In short, the French emphasize bodies where the U.S. is not present (the EC or WEU) or where the U.S. has only one vote among 51 or more (the CSCE); while the Americans prefer to emphasize bodies where the U.S. has historically had a great deal of influence (NATO) and may succeed in having a fair amount of weight in the future (NACC). [Ref. 37:p. 51] This conflict with France as to the development of NACC may prove to be one of the main reasons that neither it nor the CSCE will be an ineffective policy tool for the pursuit of United States national interests.

2. CSCE.

The CSCE began in July of 1973, the results of the Conference closed on 1 August 1975 with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The most recent negotiations to take place were concluded with the Helsinki Document 1992 that was approved July 10, 1992. The CSCE has drawn considerable attention since the Collapse of Eastern Europe and The Soviet Union because it is structurally equipped to be a post-cold war organization. It's a pan-European organization with a multilateral rather than bloc to bloc structure. [Ref. 34:p. 64] The perilous dilution that American influence suffers in CSCE was discussed earlier. The CSCE possesses a significant mandate when it comes to human rights and peace keeping, yet it has very little ability to back up any decisions either economically or militarily.

The CSCE states that, "Gross violations of CSCE commitments in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including those related to national minorities, pose a special threat to the peaceful development of society, in particular in new democracies." [Ref. 38:p. 3] No recommendations for action are provided save to say that there exists a "determination to hold all parties accountable for their actions." [Ref. 38:p. 4] The CSCE does have peacekeeping powers but it must seek "on a case by case basis, the support of international institutions and organizations." [Ref 38:p. 5] In essence it is another forum for international discussion that is only politically binding. Lothar Ruhl politely characterizes the effectiveness of the CSCE in the following statement from *The German Tribune*, "Two years of experimenting with institutionalization of the CSCE process," with European "crisis management" and with "cooperative security structures" have only gone to show that the ways and means adopted are unsuitable to contain acute crises." [Ref.39:p. 2] Karsten Voigt the Foreign Policy spokesman for the SDP in Germany proposes four possible roles for CSCE in a new security order: [Ref. 40:p. 3]

1. The CSCE evolves into a treaty on European Security and cooperation, able to take action and impose sanctions, virtually replacing NATO.
2. NATO transforms itself into the CSCE countries peacekeeping body.
3. NATO remains a military alliance, assuming additional functions related to political and economic stabilization as defined by the CSCE objectives.
4. NATO, the CSCE, The North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the WEU and other European institutions coordinate their activities and forge links so as to establish pan-European security structures. This would also require NATO and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to make substantial changes and to contribute to security and stability throughout the CSCE area. NATO and/or the

North Atlantic Cooperation Council would become part of the security and stability system within the CSCE area.

The difficulties with these options should become obvious from the viewpoint of American policy interests. Both numbers 1 and 2 subjugate United States policy to European decision makers and would involve a form of alliance that may allow Europeans to dictate United States military employment. Number 3 appears to remove the collective security nature of the NATO alliance and Number 4 requires the development of a very large supranational organization. Given the European experience with the Maastricht Treaty this is not a likely option. Perhaps Joffe puts it best when he says, "to entrust this 48 nation body with the task of maintaining peace is like Messrs. Kellog and Briand asking the nations of the world to abolish war by solemn treaty." [Ref. 41:p. 48] Douglas T. Stuart finds a different reason for the faltering of future CSCE effectiveness, once again rooted in the familiar conflict between the interests of France and the United States. "The campaign to build up the CSCE was smothered, however, by American ambivalence (because it saw the CSCE as a threat to NATO) and by French reticence (because it preferred the EC as the cornerstone of the new European order)." [Ref. 34:p. 65] Stuart goes on to claim that this is the reason that the CSCE has been unable to make any significant contributions to European security since the end of the cold war even though it has had several opportunities including the conflict in Yugoslavia.

It must be understood that organizations such as these can only have the power given to it by its members. The NACC and the CSCE are both victims of the national interests of such nations as France and the United States. The French desire for a more Euro-centric security mechanism, once again Dr. Shapir's "from security in

Europe to European security," has doomed the organizations where the United States may have gained major influence, to debate societies with the power to sanction other organizations for peacekeeping. The United States, with its view of NATO as the backbone of its European policy, would certainly be resistant to diluting its influence by adding more members. NATO, however, has lost its reason for existence, and as Josef Joffe says, "history tells us that alliances rarely, if ever, persist past the point of victory, let alone in the absence of a threat and an enemy." [Ref. 34:p. 47] If this is the case, where does the future lie for the United States as it attempts to influence policy in Russia, Ukraine and Western Europe?

3. The United Nations.

The next logical step may be to look to the United Nations as a structure for the pursuit of foreign policy goals. The United Nations, under article 39, has granted the Security Council the authorization to define, "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and under article 42, "it may take such action...as may be necessary to restore peace and security." [Ref. 42] Joffe dismisses the UN from ever being able to provide true collective security and that, whenever the UN has taken security action, it is because of a major organizer who puts together a *posse comitatus* that uses the UN and its Security Council for "legale cover." [Ref. 41:pp. 38-39]

Action that the United States could pursue in the UN, pertaining to Europe or Russia, has another risky element, the Security Council. Stuart contends that, "The most direct way to resolve the problem of voting within the NACC on issues of collective security and pacific settlement is to place such decisions under the authority of the UN

Security Council." [Ref. 34:p. 67] With the approval of the Security Council required for policy actions, the United States places its policy objectives in the uncertain hands of coalition politics. Convincing the other permanent members would often times be more difficult than it is within the NATO framework. Future modifications that have been proposed for the Security Council, such as the addition of Germany or Japan or both, would have a serious affect on the United State's ability to pursue policy goals in Europe. Expecting to maintain control over the voting members of the UN Security Council is not a realistic option.

B. CONCLUSIONS

It seems intuitively obvious that the United States has an interest in creating stability in Russia, Ukraine and Western Europe. The United States and Europe are not in a position to dictate terms to Ukraine and Russia, yet it is in Western interests to see that the conventional and nuclear arsenals left behind by the disintegration of communism are, at the very least, downsized. Europe and the United States both stand to gain from the increased availability of markets and resources that the break-up of the Soviet Union provides.

The control and disposition of both conventional and nuclear assets is an issue whose answer is not clear. European security structures have produced the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty which limits essential fighting equipment in the area of the Atlantic to the Urals. This treaty was designed to reduce levels of threat under a Soviet structure. Its application to the republics of Russia and Ukraine does require equipment reduction, but still leaves them as the two largest conventional military powers

on the European continent. The most serious issue for the United States is the disposition of nuclear weapons. These two conventional powers both have nuclear weapons on their soil. Recently, Ukraine has shown signs of changing its mind about becoming a non-nuclear state. This should send a ripple of recognition through United States policy makers that this is a core issue.

European security structures that exist today are not equipped to deal with the core issue of nuclear weapons. It has been demonstrated that Russia and Ukraine are not in a position to affect Europe directly with conventional warfare in the immediate future. Yet any conflict between these two powers would have direct effects on European security prospects. Scenarios have been developed that suggest possible smaller conflicts, such as in the Baltics, but these appear to be currently manageable within the existing security structures. The issue of nuclear weapons is not. The United States will have to pursue a policy of bilateral, or perhaps trilateral, negotiations with Russia and Ukraine. Once this begins, it would be highly likely that the other two republics who possess nuclear weapons would also want to participate.

START is a good place to begin but it is naive to expect that it is the end of nuclear weapons management for the former Soviet Union. These countries will not be able to comply without serious assistance from the West. This assistance can not be solely in the form of monetary aid. It, instead, must be a broad package that includes investment, technological assistance, personnel training and new agreements on security. Above all, the goals must be bound by security assurances to those giving up weapons and they must be realistic. When asked about the ability of Russia to dismantle nuclear

weapons in accordance with START, a Russian journalist, Pavel Fellgenhauer, replied, "Russia, in its current situation, will not be able to accomplish this in fifty years let alone by the year 2000." [Ref. 43] These countries have deep historical attitudes that affect their policies toward one another and without security assurances that are backed by credible means, Western commitment for example, the distrust will continue. The Western powers have a historic opportunity to establish security and peace on a broad scale. In order to take advantage of this opportunity it is imperative that new thinking, and perhaps new structures, be developed

The countries of the former Soviet Union may be in a similar situation as Europe after World War II, but they are not likely to be able to influence a pact as historically unprecedented as NATO was. Yet, as Henry Kissinger says, "No issue is more urgent than to relate the former Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe to Western Europe and NATO." [Ref. 44:p. 5] This sort of thinking needs to be extended to the republics of the former Soviet Union. This time it will have to be generated by nations who have no historical ties, but whose security interests have been thrown into line by the realization that an interdependent Europe is potentially more stable and prosperous than a Europe whose resources are divided by the potential for armed conflict, short term economic considerations or nationalist isolationism.

IV. UNITED STATES AID POLICY

The United States established that a non-nuclear Ukraine was an objective of foreign policy when, upon recognition, Washington stipulated that "problems concerning nuclear arms, human rights issues and Soviet debt problems must be resolved." [Ref. 45:p. 38] The issue that has risen out of these initial policy statements has been the connectivity between the resolution of the nuclear arms questions and the provision of assistance. The paradox of this issue is that it has caused the impasse in relations between Ukraine and the United States.

The United States has taken several initiatives to aid the new republics of the former Soviet Union. The first of these was the Nunn-Lugar amendment of 1991, that set aside \$400 million for assistance in disarmament. Ukraine's portion of the allocated sum was to be \$150 million. The delivery of this assistance was predicated on the signing of the START and NPT treaties. As of this writing, Ukraine had received none of this aid.

The second aid initiative undertaken by United States policy makers was the Freedom Support Act. The structure of the Freedom support Act set down preconditions for aid that were a reflection of the concerns that Congress had with regard to constituent parameters. Section 5 of S.2532 defines the constituent parameters that make the bill politically feasible. These four conditions were:

- (1) institutionalize the rule of law to protect individual freedoms and human rights

- (2) enact the legal and policy frameworks necessary for the conduct of private business activities and the privatization of state owned enterprises
- (3) demonstrate respect for international law and obligations and adherence to the principals of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, including those related to the right of emigration
- (4) implement responsible security policies, including the avoidance of excessive defense expenditures, full compliance with international arms control agreements, and active participation in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of destabilizing technology to develop such weapons. [Ref. 46:]

Section five goes on to set more specific limits for what the President must consider before providing aid within these parameters, including a prohibition of aid to Azerbaijan until the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh was moving towards satisfactory resolution.

Sections seven and eight proceed to identify areas of activity for which funding will be made available in accordance with the preconditions established in section 5.

It could be argued that the structure provided a political scapegoat for Senators by allowing them to point to a country's inability to meet the preconditions for aid as reason for non-action. "This legislation, S. 3252, endorses the overall goal of using American expertise to bring democracy and development to the former Soviet republics. But the bill simply outlines nine broad purposes to achieve these ends...." Senator Seymour continues to describe what he perceives as problems and states, "These defects would surely undermine the noble purpose of this bill." [Ref. 47:p. 213] The structure was necessary to allow for political feasibility in light of the political climate. Senator Lieberman defined the need for this political feasibility in his speech during the floor debate,

Foreign aid is, obviously a politically charged program, and particularly so in an economic recession such as we are in now. That is why I think, as we enter this post-Cold War world we have to redefine foreign aid, making sure it is directed toward our own economic interests. [Ref. 47:p. 212]

The major criticisms that arose in the floor debate focused on American domestic concerns in comparison to the need to aid these new nations. This was the cost benefit analysis being performed in public. On the cost side, the arguments were typified by Senator DeConcini, "Before we pour money into solving the problems abroad, we must turn our attention to the long neglected problems here at home." [Ref. 47:p. 207] Senator Byrd, whose power in Congress is well documented, said, "There is no doubt that Russia and the former Soviet states face a severe economic problems, but we can not ignore the fact that we have severe economic and unemployment problems right here at home." [Ref. 47:p. 217] The challenge to the supporters of the act was to answer these criticisms that were a reflection of the popular political climate described earlier.

Supporters responded by raising three significant points. First, that the West had spent vast amounts of money to defeat communism and totalitarianism and that it could not afford to miss the narrow opportunity to bring democracy and open markets to this region of the world. This point was typified by Senator Durenberger who said, "To put it in economic terms, the United States has spent over \$6 trillion to achieve this very outcome; the end of totalitarian communism. So to balk at an additional investment of less than one one-thousandth of that amount to consolidate these gains is ludicrous." [Ref. 47:p. 208]

The second principle proposed as justification for aid was the benefit to the domestic economy that the vast new markets opened would ultimately contribute to American growth and profit. Senator Lieberman illustrated this idea with the following statement:

If we help American companies enter these emerging markets, we are going to create income and jobs here at home, then I think we can assure the American people that for every dollar invested in an assistance program in the nations of the former Soviet Union, we are going to enjoy a dividend of many dollars many times over. [Ref. 47:p. 212]

The third major theme in defense of aid was the obvious security problems that came from the breakup of the Soviet Union. The forces that had previously existed were in disarray, but they still existed. Large numbers of nuclear and conventional forces had to be dealt with and stability in the region would be a key to ensuring peaceful transition to the economic and social goals of the bill. "The ominous fact must also be stated that 30,000 nuclear weapons and the largest conventional force ever assembled did not disappear when the Berlin Wall was torn down. The safety of Europe and the world could depend of whether order or chaos will reign in the former Soviet Union." [Ref. 47:p. 208]

Once the cost benefit analysis of the aid bill had been accomplished, the bill was passed by the full Senate. Specific amendments had been attached to the bill as a result of the analysis and in order to narrow the bill's policy goals. Four of these amendments will be used to demonstrate this point.

First is the amendment proposed by Senator Larry Pressler which denied aid to Russia until significant progress toward the withdrawal of Russian troops from the soil

of the Baltic Republics. Second is Senator Pell's amendment regarding aid to Azerbaijan. Both of these amendments were designed to address issues that threatened stability in the region. The Baltic nations had played a significant role in the breakup of the Soviet Union and were militant about international assistance in achieving the withdrawal of Russian troops. This amendment was adopted by a vote of 92-2 but only after a Pell and Lugar amendment that gave a one year grace period before sanctions could be imposed on Russia. This amendment was passed by a 60 to 35 vote. In this case Congress was sending a message that it valued the sovereignty of the Baltics but was realistic about the time it would take to withdraw the troops.

The Azerbaijan amendment made political sense in that the bill had defined the independent states of the former Soviet Union to include Azerbaijan. In light of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Senator Pell felt it was necessary to initiate specific conditions for aid to Azerbaijan.

Senator Lieberman's amendment that highlighted the repayment of debt was another policy amendment that addressed a significant issue in the aid debate. Addressing debt was seen as a way the new republics could demonstrate fiscal responsibility that had not been dealt with in the structure of the bill. The amendment was designed to send the policy message that if these countries reneged on contractual obligations that they could expect no aid, in essence providing assurances to investors.

The FSA has been followed by further aid commitments by President Clinton at the Vancouver Summit. This aid package has yet to be approved by Congress. Aid packages that have been developed by the United States demonstrate the perceived

necessity for immediate treaty compliance. This linkage with Cold War policy means has proved to be a roadblock for both the distribution and effectiveness of the aid packages. If the goal for American policy makers is to promote stability, then linkage will only hinder any progress.

V. INTERNAL UKRAINE

The domestic situation in Ukraine is chaotic. The leadership is in constant conflict as it struggles to build a state under the old communist constitution and the economy is in peril of launching into hyperinflation at any time. Ukraine was considered the most prosperous of the Soviet Republics but the economy since independence has shown no ability to make the transition from planned to free market. This issue claimed the political lives of several ministers including the reformer Lanavoy who was Minister of Industry and the Prime Minister Vitold Foikin who was replaced in September of 1992.

Ukraine has focused its energy on state building in accordance with its national mission to remain separate from Russia. To detail the domestic environment of Ukraine, this chapter will focus on Ukraine's economic crisis and the problems it presents for domestic policy makers.

A. ECONOMY

The economy of Ukraine suffers from the post planned economy hangover that plagues all the nations that have emerged from the Soviet Empire. The growing conflict between the Ukrainian quest for statehood and economic prosperity was typified in Prime Minister Kuchma's speech to parliament on January 20, 1993 when he stated, "the absence of adequate plans for development of our state and economy has resulted in the situation when Ukraine has proper attribute of its statehood, but is still not able to produce the Ukrainian sausage and vodka." [Ref. 48:p. 26]

Statistics portray the bleak condition of the Ukrainian Economy. In the last six months of 1992, GNP fell by 13%, and National income fell by 15%. Inflation figures for 1992 are estimated at 2000% while the deficit forecast for 1993 is three trillion rubles. Ukraine's longstanding claim as the bastion of agricultural production was shaken by a 25% decline. Every sector of economic activity shows the same symptoms, petroleum refining fell 27%, capital investment down 45% and the index of consumer prices had risen 126.5% between the months of May and June 1992. [Ref. 49:pp. 6-7]

The transition has not been easy in any country with a former command economy. Ukraine has been depicted as moving slow on reforms that have appeared to work in other places. One difficulty that has hindered Ukraine is the development of an independent currency. Remaining in the rouble zone was seen as an old link with Russia that needed to be severed. The issue of the coupon in 1990 and 1991 was predicated not by sound economic principle but instead by nationalist pressure. Coupons were to be used in conjunction with rubles so that only Ukrainians could purchase supposedly superior consumer goods. [Ref. 50:p. 9] This period of the coupon was abandoned in mid-1991. The rebirth of the coupon came in the wake of Gaidar's price reforms in Russia during January of 1992. The coupon was again issued to protect Ukrainian consumers from Russians who would cross the border to take advantage of relatively lower prices. The coupon became the substitute currency for the Rouble upon Ukraine's departure from the Rouble Zone in November of 1992.

The coupon has proved to be a disaster for Ukraine's economy. Since leaving the Rouble zone, the exchange rate has steadily declined. In June of 1992 the coupon was

officially exchanged at 56.68 coupons for \$100 while the market rate was at 8,500.00 coupons. [Ref. 49:p. 7] The first six months of 1993 have been even less kind as the exchange rate for \$100 has gone to over 3,000,000 coupons. [Ref. 51:p. 55] "The two crucial missing ingredients have been hard currency reserves and a proper system of monetary control." [Ref. 50:p. 10]

Sound economic principle would have dictated that Ukraine not embark on the pursuit of its own currency until it had developed the resources to do so. Ukrainians were hit doubly hard by Russian price reforms as their currency fell against the rouble. Prices rose swiftly at home and production and wages did not keep up. Practicality came into conflict with nationalism as "the restoration of the *Hrivnia* became for many nationalists the touchstone of true Ukrainian control over her own economic destiny." [Ref. 50:p. 10] The purpose of a Ukrainian currency should not be, as politician Myroslav Popovych put it, "to wave it around on sticks like a substitute flag." [Ref. 50:p. 13]

B. ENERGY

Energy is the critical economic issue in Ukraine. Two facets of energy production--petroleum use and nuclear energy--are consistently neglected tools of foreign influence. Thermal power stations account for nearly 71% of the electrical output in Ukraine. [Ref. 52:p. 54] Many of these stations burn oil as fuel, and oil is in scarce supply. In the last six months of 1992, energy production from thermal energy plants decreased by 17% due to lack of fuels. [Ref. 49:p. 6] Ukraine has concluded several deals for oil but Russia, under the pressure of the international monetary fund, has raised

oil prices to world market levels. Ukraine will be unable to pay for the oil that it has already ordered.

In May of 1992 the G-7 recommended the closure of 26 nuclear reactors in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, including all the operating RBMK models in Russia and Ukraine. [Ref. 52:p. 55] These reactors are considered to be unsafe by Western standards and are of the same type that caused the Chernobyl disaster. Russia and Ukraine experienced 39 unscheduled shutdowns and four accidents that included personnel injury or equipment damage between 1 January 1991 and 1 April 1992 in these RBMK reactors. During the same period, Russia and Ukraine experienced 270 unscheduled shutdowns overall and five accidents. [Ref. 53:p. 50] In May of 1992 Ukraine suffered five unscheduled shutdowns, none of these resulted in a rise of background radiation but at one time half of Ukraine's nuclear power grid was off line. [Ref. 52:p. 55] The problems with the sarcophagus that protects the destroyed Chernobyl reactor are well documented. "Birds fly into the sarcophagus through holes as big as a garage door....The structure is so unsteady that a strong windstorm could smash it." [Ref. 54:p. 44] The structure of the sarcophagus has over 1000 square meters of cracks [Ref. 52:p. 57] that make the structure unstable and allow the seepage of ground water through the radioactive waste. This ground water is "backing up behind a concrete barrier that is near a reservoir that supplies water to the 2.6 million residents of Kiev." [Ref. 54:p. 45]

The cost of bringing the reactors throughout the former communist countries up to Western standards has been estimated at about 7.5 billion dollars. [Ref. 53:p. 50]

This is a price tag that these countries can ill afford, and little Western aid has been earmarked for this type of project. Russia and Ukraine are unable to stop nuclear energy production, Ukraine depends on nuclear power for 25 percent of its electric power [Ref. 52:p. 54], without placing serious hardship on already strapped economies.

C. CONCLUSIONS

Ukraine faces overwhelming domestic problems that must be considered within the context of American policy development. Ukraine's overriding policy goal is to separate from Russia, but economic and energy considerations hang like an anchor around the government's neck. These two areas present a golden opportunity for the United States to institute confidence building measures that involve investment but would provide significant assistance, using policy instruments already established in previous aid packages.

The key to using those policy instruments is to destroy the linkage that has been established between aid and compliance with old policy means which do not address the goal of a stable Ukraine as a counterweight to potential Russian super power regeneration.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States must establish an overall goal for the conduct of policy with the former Soviet Union. The treaties, structures and policy pursuits that brought about an end to the Cold War are directed at regenerating Russia as the superpower successor to the Soviet Union. The strategic problems that accompany a new Russian super power should force policy makers to question if this is truly in the United States' national interest.

The willingness to allow Russia to become the sole nuclear and economic power to emerge from the Soviet Union is a dangerous prospect for Western Security. Kissinger pointed out that Russia has no democratic historical perspective that should lead the West to believe that democracy will succeed. Should it fail and an authoritarian regime arise, the United States will have assisted in creating a regime that is a serious threat to the democratic community of states.

Territorial reconstitution of the Empire, whether it be the Soviet or Russian, will mean the forceful subjugation of peoples who now reside in independent states. The people of the new republics have demonstrated the will to exist independently of Russian domination, but the West would be powerless to help them. Terrorism against Russia would inevitably arise out of domination. An authoritarian Russia would present the West with Human Rights policy problems on a larger scale than in the Cold War. Combine these factors with a potential refugee burden unlike any in recent history, and the security

problems for the West are obvious. The threat of a third World War and the potential for nuclear holocaust seems to have slipped from the West's collective consciousness. Were Russia to embark on a campaign to reconstitute, what options would the West have? The standard answer to this question would be that Russia, economically, could not afford a pursuit of this nature, and is on the verge of collapse itself. History demonstrates the polities do not only fight wars over economics; nationalist forces and territorial claims have driven many conflicts.

Russia provides a potentially huge market for Western investment that, combined with a peaceful and cooperative political environment, could provide for generations of prosperity. It would be foolish for United States policy makers to alienate this possibility. However, the potential for Russia to go awry must be prepared for. Ukraine provides the United States with a potential regional counterweight to Russian territorial expansion that would allow Russian leaders to focus on domestic reform.

Continued insistence on the rapid ratification of nuclear agreements is driving a wedge between Ukraine and the United States. United States policy makers must realize that proliferation of nuclear weapons has already occurred. The dissolution of the Soviet Union spread nuclear weapons into four different countries, each with different security needs. The developing feeling within Ukraine is that these weapons provide some sort of deterrence against Russian aggression. Whether or not they do is not the problem; the fact that Ukrainians believe they do is the issue. Comments from legislators in reference to nuclear weapons such as, "for some reason we have agreed not only to take off our armor but also our underwear" [Ref. 55:p. 44], demonstrate the Ukrainian perception of

deterrence. Western policy makers can not make this fear of Russia go away overnight. They can begin confidence building measures that create an environment for initiating the process of disarmament.

In order to make Ukraine an acceptable balance to Russian power, the United States must reorganize its global security goals. First and foremost, the United States must shift emphasis away from the complete denuclearization of the former republics and focus more on the process of reduction of arsenals. Beginning with START I, the United States can take the initiative to develop a program that provides international monitoring for the transfer and dismantling of START I weapons. This should be a priority similar to the Middle East peace talks. Establishment of a permanent forum, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Commission, to coordinate and monitor the transfer and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. A forum of this nature would address Ukrainian security concerns while assisting Russia with compliance. This forum would also develop an equitable formula for the disposition of nuclear material and missile components. A group of this nature does not solve all problems immediately but does provide for a problem solving process which does not currently exist.

The environment for disarmament begins with removal of aid linkage from nuclear weapons. Providing assistance to Ukraine to ease domestic stress can be accomplished by measures already established by the Nunn-Lugar Amendment and the Freedom Support Act. The example to follow here is that of Europe. The European Community has taken on stabilization projects that are not linked to any kind of security assurances, for example the EC Energy Center in Kiev. This center was established to help Ukrainian organiza-

tions deal with energy problems and to integrate new energy technologies into Kiev. It does not deal with nuclear energy. The center has conducted an audit of energy problems in Kiev and produced a prioritized list of projects. The center's activities are now being expanded to the rest of Ukraine. [Ref. 56:p. 33] The importance of a project like this is that it provides assistance that addresses Ukrainian problems without linking policy concessions from the Ukrainian government. The EC receives the market for energy technologies in a historically backward energy market while American companies are closed out. The United States must realize that it is losing out on potential markets by linking its aid programs to the START and NPT treaties.

A new comprehensive political strategy for the United States must not give up on nuclear disarmament. The process of disarmament should be emphasized. It has been a year and a half since the initial proliferation of weapons and little progress has been made toward dismantling of arsenals. These weapons will be in place for many years after the process begins. The new strategy must put stable governments and economies on an equal plane with disarmament issues. Security concerns of each nuclear power must be taken into account.

In the current security environment, Ukraine will see that it is to its advantage to retain a nuclear capability as a deterrent to Russian aggression. The coming renegotiation of the NPT is a potential security forum where new initiatives for general security assurances could be provided. Security issues could also be addressed through the development of a consultation forum that includes the West, Russia and Ukraine. This forum would provide the opportunity to discuss security concerns and perhaps lead to

agreements that would provide Ukraine greater assurances over territorial integrity. These concerns can not be properly addressed through either existing treaties or security structures.

The United States can not allow a regenerated Russian super power. Engagement in Europe requires a security strategy that uses Ukraine as balance to Russian power, this will provide the West the opportunity and the time to draw Russia into a community of nations in Europe that benefits overall security. Ukraine will be included in this community with its large economic potential and position as security buffer for its region. These factors will allow the United States to continue to focus domestically on economic reform without the disruption of a new threat to European Security.

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